Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
M any think that a consumption tax should fully tax consumers' use of financial services, but implementing such taxation has proven difficult. Indeed, the proper taxation of consumers' use of financial services has been one of the major stumbling blocks in designing consumption taxes (Bradford, 1996; Danforth and Boren, 1994; Hall-Rabushka, 1995; Merrill and Adrion, 1995; Mintz and Seade, 1991; Domenici, Nunn, and Kerrey, 1995; Poddar and English, 1997) . One main problem is that very often financial services are not priced separately, but rather are reflected in a lower return received by a saver and a higher interest cost paid by a borrower. The issue of how to tax them still remains, however, even if there is a separate price and occurs regardless of whether the consumption tax is of the "real" or the cash-flow type.
The argument that consumers' use of financial services must be fully taxed is rooted in perceptions of economic efficiency 1 (see, e.g., Merrill and Adrion, 1995; Hoffman, Poddar, and Whalley, 1987; and Whalley, 1991) . If the service is not taxed, its price will be too low, relative to the price of other, fully taxed, goods and services. This price distortion will induce consumers to allocate too large a share of their income to untaxed financial services and too small a share to other, fully taxed, goods and services. Consequently, according to this argument, financial services must be fully taxed in order to have an allocationally efficient, "neutral," consumption tax.
We offer an efficiency based argument that reaches the opposite conclusion. Many financial services used by consumers are not consumption goods. For example, investment services affect the price of buying an investment good, not the price of buying a consumption good. Clearly, such services facilitate consumption by allowing the consumer to transfer resources over time, and so smooth his consumption stream. But they are not themselves consumption goods; they are a component of the price of the investment or saving good, they are a business not a consumption expense. As nonconsumption goods, such financial services should not be in the base of a consumption tax. Tax-neutral treatment of present and future consumption (i.e., economic efficiency) requires expensing of the cost of the physical machine as well as any financial costs of the investment. Imposing a tax on investment service fees that are not consumption goods, far from ensuring tax neutrality, instead will distort consumers' decisions by, in essence, overtaxing future consumption. In addition to investment fees, fees associated with consumer borrowing and with insurance seem to fit this model. We develop our argument below. We first review our assumption that investment services, insurance services, and borrowing services are not consumption goods. We next develop at length our no tax argument. We differentiate financial intermediation fees from other fees, such as transportation fees, which seem analytically similar. The essence of this distinction is that in the cases of investment, borrowing, and insurance, there is always a fully taxable purchase of a consumption good. For example, an investment is used as the vehicle to finance fully taxable future consumption. In contrast, in the case of transportation services, there often is no opportunity to fully tax consumption in the distant location, so the transportation fee must be taxed.
In our discussion of consumer durables and of insurance, we emphasize that a tax prepayment approach can be used as an alternative to a direct tax on the consumption flows. Under a prepayment approach, all expenditures on an investment or an insurance policy, including any financial fees, would be taxed when made, but the consumption flows that such expenditures allow would be exempt from tax. The two approaches are equivalent to the consumer and neither distorts relative prices. In contrast to results in the literature (Barham, Poddar, and Whalley, 1987; Bradford et al., 1984) , however, we find that the prepayment approach for insurance is efficient because it imposes no effective tax on the financial service fee, not because it taxes the fee.
We also discuss the taxation of fees associated with consumer leases and with checking accounts. We conclude that financial fees associated with consumer leases should be taxed, since they represent part of the payment for a consumption flow. We reach no definite conclusion in the difficult case of checking account fees.
Certain practical considerations may make it difficult to give tax exemption to financial services. In our brief discussion of these, we take a position contrary to much received wisdom and argue that pricing structures that bundle financial fees together with other components of the cost of a good do not necessarily raise difficult tax issues.
After completing and circulating a first draft of our paper, we became aware of an earlier work by Whalley (1991) that makes an argument similar to the one we advance.
3 Our argument, however, differs from Whalley's in several specifics, and in the penultimate section, we briefly discuss how our analysis compares with Whalley's. The paper concludes with a brief summary.
A CONSUMPTION TAX SHOULD TAX ONLY CONSUMPTION
In this section, we present our argument that several categories of financial services purchased by consumers should not be included in the base of a consumption tax, because they are not items of consumption. Put another way, consumption efficiency requires that a consumption tax raise proportionately the price of all consumables. 4 An equal proportional price increase requires, in turn, that fees associated with investment, borrowing, and insurance be exempt from tax. Otherwise, consumption in some periods, or in some states of nature, will be more heavily taxed than will consumption in other periods or states of nature.
Many Financial Services Are Not Consumption Goods
As a preliminary matter, we emphasize that we are analyzing household use of financial services, not business use of such services. Tax exemption of financial services used by businesses is conceded to be proper under a consumption tax (Bradford, 1996; Thornbury, 1991) ; these services are a cost of business and so should not be in the base of a consumption tax. Moreover, whether consumption tax systems are adjusted to ensure that financial services are taxed to households is irrelevant to a business. For example, if a bank charged for demand deposit services by an interest spread, then a valueadded tax (VAT) applied to the bank would exempt from tax the value of those services used by households. To the extent that such services represent consumption, the exemption is inappropriate. But there would be no problem for business uses of such services, because they should not be taxed anyway. If the household problem were fixed by imputing the value of demand deposit services to the bank, the business would be able to deduct their cost. Failure to include value added at the bank is offset by nondeduction by the business, and the offset is exact if both firms face the same tax rate. We do not revisit these issues, but instead enquire whether household use of certain financial services ought to be tax exempt as well.
Our argument starts from the view that consumption goods directly yield the consumer utility. They are the arguments of his utility function and include such things as food, clothing, housing, recreation, and entertainment, both now and in the future. Many financial services used by the consumer, however, seem to us unlikely to yield him utility. Take, for example, a consumer's purchase of professional investment advice. Clearly, professional investment advice may increase the return from investment, and so increase both present and future consumption possibilities. But, in and of itself, that is, independent of the improved consumption possibilities, investment advice does not yield utility to the consumer. We adopt a similar perspective on fees associated with insurance. Clearly, the purchase of insurance allows the consumer to smooth his consumption across states of nature, and so allows him to raise his utility. But independent of this consumption smoothing, an insurance agent's service offers no utility to the consumer; insurance services are not a consumption item.
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Investment Services
We now explain our argument that economic efficiency calls for tax exemption of financial services, because such services are not consumption goods.
Our argument is most easily grasped for the case of a real investment, say, a machine. Under a consumption tax of the immediate deduction type (e.g., a value added tax, a consumed income tax, or a national sales tax), the machine should not be taxed when purchased. Instead, the future consumption financed by the machine should be taxed. Exempting the cost of the machine from the tax base in the year purchased, i.e., expensing the machine, is the proper accounting of its cost. Expensing eliminates any tax wedge between an investment's marginal product, its "social" return, and the net return received by the investor. Consequently, expensing does not affect the price of future relative to current consumption (the rate of exchange across time), and so ensures that the consumer's choice of how to allocate his consumption over time, i.e., of how much to save, will be efficient (Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987, chapters 5 and 9; Sandmo, 1985) .
But suppose that the investor employs an advisor to find the most profitable use for the machine. How should the investor treat the advisor's fee for tax purposes? We contend that the advisor's fee represents part of the investment's total cost, and so should be expensed. Expensing of the fee, as well as of the physical cost of the machine, is necessary to prevent a tax distortion in the choice between present and future consumption.
We formalize our argument using a standard life-cycle model. 6 Our consumer lives for two periods and cares about his consumption in period 1 (C 1 ) and in period 2 (C 2 ). The market price of the consumption good is P in each period. He receives an endowment E in the first period, which he can consume immediately or use to purchase a saving good (S), which allows him to finance secondperiod consumption. The saving good, which may be thought of as a machine, has a direct cost of P per unit , 7 as well as an associated investment service fee of P i per unit. 8 The market interest rate, earned by the physical machine, is r. We use the endowment as numeraire, and it can be thought of as labor units.
With no taxes, the consumer spends PC 1 of his endowment in the first period and saves the rest to provide for secondperiod consumption. Thus, in the first pe- Foley (1970) for an early discussion of a similar model. 7 In the formulation in the text, present consumption, future consumption, and the nonfee component of the saving good all have the same market price, P This is for convenience only. It does not affect the results. If, instead, each were to have a separate price, the consumer's budget constraint would be given by E = P 1 C 1 + (P s + P i )P 2 C 2 /P s (1 + r). The consumer's first-period price of second-period consumption,(P s + P i )P 2 /P s (1 + r), is slightly more complicated than it is in the text, owing to the price differential between C 2 and S. The analysis, however, goes forward exactly as in the text. Our analysis also would be unaffected if the financial service fee were modeled as proportional to the nonfee price of the saving good, so that the full price of the saving good would be (1 + s)P, where s is the proportional financial service fee. 8 Our results are unchanged if we allow the fee to be a variable function of the amount invested, or of units of the investment good purchased, as discussed below.
riod, the consumer's budget constraint is E = PC 1 + (P + P i )S, which says that spending on first-period consumption plus saving equals the endowment. In the second period, the consumer receives his return, r, and sells the machine in order to finance consumption. In the second period, his budget constraint is PC 2 = (1 + r)PS. Combining these two into a single budget equation gives
Equation 1 says that the present value of the consumer's spending on the two consumption goods equals the value of his endowment. It also shows that the price of a unit of second-period consumption, in terms of endowment units forgone, is (P + P i )/(1 + r), while the price of a unit of first-period consumption is P. Alternatively, the price of second-period consumption relative to the price of firstperiod consumption is (P + P i )/P(1 + r). This can be rewritten as [
where f = P i /P, which shows that the effect of the financial fee is to raise the discount factor from 1/(1 + r) to (1 + f )/(1 + r), or to lower the "effective" interest rate from r to (r -f )/(1 + f ). This is a consequence of our assumption that the fee is not recovered upon the sale of the asset in the second period.
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Maximizing utility implies that the consumer adjusts his consumption choices so that his marginal rate of substitution (MRS) equals the price ratio:
[2] MRS 21 = (P + P i )/P(1 + r)
where MRS 21 is the marginal rate of substitution of C 2 for C 1 (the number of units of C 1 he is willing to give up in exchange for one unit of C 2 , holding his utility constant).
Since prices are undistorted, condition 2 also characterizes an economically efficient allocation of consumption over time. 10 The consumer is willing to trade future for present consumption at the rate allowed by the available technology, which is determined by the fee adjusted interest rate. Now, suppose that a consumption tax at rate τ is imposed on purchases of C 1 and C 2 , but that the investment service is not taxed. As the base is consumption spending, the full cost of the saving good, including the financial fee, is excluded from tax. The fee would be expensed under a consumed income tax or a VAT.
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The consumer's intertemporal budget constraint is given by E = (1 + τ)PC 1 + (1 + τ)(P + P i )C 2 /(1 + r), or
[3] E/(1 + τ) = PC 1 +(P + P i )C 2 /(1 + r). 9 We chose this approach because often financial fees are collected in the form of a reduced interest rate. Our results, however, in no way depend on our assumption that the fee reduces the effective interest rate. Modeling the fee as recoverable, with interest, upon the sale of the saving good leaves unchanged our result that consumption efficiency calls for exempting the service fee from tax. 10 In our simple model, the no-tax equilibrium is efficient, as discussed in greater detail in the Consumer Loans section below. Hahn (1971) questions whether market equilibria in the presence of transactions costs are always efficient. The issue of the efficiency of the no-tax market equilibrium, however, is secondary in our paper. Those who argue for the full taxation of financial services do not suggest that a tax is called for to correct a market failure in the no-tax world. Rather, they argue for full taxation in order to avoid tax distortions in what they (implicitly) take to be otherwise efficient prices, and this is the argument that we address. 11 There are many equivalent ways to implement a consumption tax, such as a consumed income tax, a national sales tax, and a VAT (see Brashares and Kalambokidis (1996) on equivalence). Our no-tax result refers to real tax burdens as perceived by consumers, and so is independent of the form of consumption tax chosen. Because of space constraints, we do not focus on undeniably important issues such as mechanics, compliance, and administration, all of which affect the choice among different ways of implementing a consumption tax.
By comparing equation 3 with 1, it is clear that the pure consumption tax does not affect the relative price of second-period consumption, and so does not distort the consumer's utility maximizing consumption choice. Another way to see that the pure consumption tax is efficient is to note that it is equivalent to a lump-sum (i.e., unavoidable) tax on his endowment at the rate of τ/(1 + τ). Now, suppose instead that investment services, as well as C 1 and C 2 , are taxed at rate τ. Then, the consumer's budget constraint may be written as
Comparing equation 4 with 1 shows that taxing the financial service in addition to C 1 and C 2 has distorted the relative price of C 2 , which rises from (P + P i )/P(1 + r) without taxes to (P + P i (1 + τ))/P(1 + r) with a consumption tax that includes the investment service fee in its base. Consequently, in making his utility maximizing consumption allocation, the consumer will set MRS 21 = (P + P i (1 + τ))/P(1 + r) > (P + P i )/P(1 + r) and so will choose too little future consumption. The tax on the financial service has created an economic inefficiency.
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In a richer model, there might be a variety of methods available for choosing where and how much to invest. For example, an investor might forgo professional investment advice and directly purchase a machine. Presumably, a consumption tax, which is generally justified by appealing to its pro-saving, pro-investing features, should not distort the choice of whether, and how intensively, to use professional investment advice. Yet, a consumption tax that included in its base investment services fees would do just that, while a pure consumption tax would leave this choice unaffected.
The consumer would prefer whichever type of investment offered the highest return. Thus, he would prefer an investment that required financial advice over an investment that did not require such advice, if (1 + r)P/(P + P i )>(1 + r d ), where r is the interest rate on an investment that requires financial advice, r d is the interest rate available on a direct investment that requires no advice, P is the direct cost of the investment good, and P i is the price of the financial service. As a pure consumption tax does not affect these returns (because it does not affect the relative price of future consumption), the consumer's income maximizing choice also is socially optimal; he picks whichever investment offers the greatest social return.
In contrast, if the investment advisory fee were taxed, the consumer's return on the associated investment would fall to (1 + r)P/(P + (1 + τ)P i ), while the consumer's return on the nonfee investment would remain unchanged. Consequently, the tax would induce the consumer to forgo a more socially productive investment made with the help of an advisor in favor of a less productive direct investment that nonetheless offers him a higher private net-of-tax return.
Interpreting Our No-Tax Result
We obtain our result because we model the fee as a component of the market price of the saving/investment good, not as a component of the market price of secondperiod consumption, and assume that all consumption spending is fully taxable. As part of the cost of investing, the fee must be exempt from tax in order to avoid affecting the consumer's relative valuation of present and future consumption. Hence, consumption efficiency calls for exempting the fee from the base of a consumption tax, just like any other component of the cost of a saving good.
It is perhaps worth re-emphasizing that we model the financial service as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. The financial service facilitates shifting consumption across time, but is not itself a consumption item. Stated slightly differently, the purchase of the saving good is in the nature of a business expense, rather than a consumption item, and so should be outside the consumption tax base. This assumption seems to us quite natural, since presumably people care about their real consumption now and in the future, not about whether they achieve their desired consumption pattern with or without the aid of professional investment advice. 13 Were the financial service a consumption item (were it an argument of the consumer's utility function), then it would be included in the base of a consumption tax.
Our assumption that consumption purchases are fully taxable also is important. 14 We assume, in essence, that the consumer sells the saving good and uses the proceeds of the sale to fund fully taxable future consumption. 15 If future consumption is not taxable (e.g., in the case of a consumer durable), then an argument for taxing the fee emerges. But that argument has nothing to do with financial services per se. Rather, the argument is that a tax prepayment approach is needed to get otherwise untaxable future consumption. The prepayment approach taxes the price of a capital asset, including the financial fee, while exempting from tax the consumption flow given off by the asset. The prepayment approach is equivalent in present value terms to the immediate deduction approach (which exempts the purchase of capital, but taxes consumption purchases), although the annual tax bases may be quite different (see, e.g., Bradford et al., 1984, chapter 4) . 16 Furthermore, the prepayment approach does not support a tax on the fee in addition to a tax on future consumption; rather, it supports a tax on the full price of the saving good, including the investment fee, instead of a tax on future consumption.
We also have assumed a linear technology in writing our budget constraint. But this assumption is not crucial. Our result does not depend on a proportional relationship between the fee and the level of saving. Rewriting the budget constraint to allow for a variable fee would not affect our conclusions. A consumption tax imposed directly on C 1 and C 2 , but exempting both the fee and the nonfee components of the price of the saving good, would not distort relative prices, and so would lead to an efficient allocation of consumption over time. To see this, write the budget line as E = C 1 + C 2 /(1 + r) + F(S), where F(S) is a general function re-13 This is the approach typically adopted in economic analyses of investment and insurance (see, eg., Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987, chapter 2; Rosen, 1992, chapter 17; Sandmo, 1985; Varian, 1978, chapter 3) , which view the purpose of saving and buying insurance as financing consumption in another period or state of nature. 14 The combination of a tax on all consumption spending and the fee being determined by the amount invested or saved implies that the base of the fee is tax-inclusive rather than tax-exclusive second-period consumption. That is, the total amount spent on the fee can be written as P i [(1 + τ)P 2 C 2 ] (ignoring interest). This result seems uncontroversial in our model, as it follows from reasonable assumptions, most importantly that the fee is a component of the cost of the saving good. 15 In a multiperiod model, all that is required is that the saving and its return are eventually spent on taxable consumption. 16 Even in the absence of financial intermediation fees, strict equivalence depends on a number of special assumptions, some of which are discussed in Brashares and Kalambokidis (1996) . Such issues, however, are far removed from our primary themes.
lating total spending on the fee to saving and the other terms are as above. Because S = (1 + τ)C 2 /(1 + r), the consumer faces a relative price ratio (1 + F')/(1 + r), independent of the tax rate on consumption. Both with and without a pure consumption tax, the consumer will maximize his utility by setting his marginal rate of substitution equal to (1 + F')/(1 + r). A pure consumption tax is efficient even with a general functional form for the financial fee.
Nonfinancial Intermediation Services
Our analysis might be read to cast doubt on the efficiency of taxing nonfinancial intermediation services, such as transportation services, when directly contracted for by the consumer. 17 Formally, for example, one might use equations (1)- (4), with C 1 and C 2 interpreted as geographic locations (e.g., consumption in New York and in Los Angeles, respectively), to argue that transportation services should not be taxed. 18 We do not support this application of our analysis. 19 It seems problematic to place transportation services in our model, because in many cases there is no natural transportation counterpart to the saving good. It is hard (but not impossible) to imagine a nonconsumption good that is purchased in order to shift consumption from New York to Los Angeles, and then sold in Los Angeles, the proceeds of which are fully taxed when consumed. 20 More often, when a consumer directly purchases transportation services, the shipped good is not sold and repurchased, with the repurchase subject to taxation. Instead, the good is directly consumed without tax consequence. In such a case, a tax on the materials component of the good would be insufficient to fully raise its price in proportion to the tax. A tax on the transportation cost also would be required. For example, a consumer might buy a chair in New York and pay to have it shipped to Los Angeles, where he plans to use it in his house. As there is no sale of the chair in Los Angeles, followed by a fully taxable repurchase, it is necessary to impose a tax on the transportation fee in order to raise the price of the consumption of the chair in Los Angeles by the full amount of the tax.
21 Stated somewhat differently, our argument is that the chair is not an intermediate good (a business expense) that is sold to finance fully taxable consumption in Los Angeles. Rather, the chair is a consumption good with a price that includes the transportation fee; this full price must be taxed to ensure neutrality. Our argument also implies that the transportation component of the market price of a chair built in New York but purchased for consumption at a retail outlet in Los Angeles should be fully taxed.
Full taxation also is required for personal service fees, such as a waiter's tip.
Our model does not apply to the purchase of a restaurant meal because there is no counterpart to the saving good. The waiter's tip is not a component of the cost of a nonconsumption intermediate good that must be purchased in order to transfer dollars into the restaurant, where all spending is fully taxed. Rather, the tip is a component of the cost of a final consumption good, the meal, and so should be fully taxed.
Consumer Loans
The analysis given for a lender carries over directly to the case of consumer loans. It is straightforward to show that a pure consumption tax, one which fully taxes both present and future consumption, but exempts loan fees, will not distort the prices faced by either borrowers or lenders. The intuition here is the same as in the investment services case. A consumption tax should not affect consumers' allocation of consumption over time. Yet, if services related to consumer loans are taxed, the cost of exchanges between borrowers and lenders can be raised, thereby inefficiently discouraging such exchanges. Even when there is no net saving, taxing the financial service can lead to distortions in consumers' choices.
Nonetheless, considering both borrowers and lenders simultaneously suggests an ambiguity. Because of the fees associated with borrowing and lending, borrowers and lenders face different relative prices. The fees raise the lender's relative price of future consumption (in terms of present consumption) above the borrower's relative price of future consumption. So, in equilibrium, the lender values future (current) consumption relatively more (less) than does the borrower. Because of this difference in valuation, social welfare could be increased if it were possible to shift future consumption from the borrower to the lender in exchange for present consumption, without incurring the transaction fees. Government policies, including tax policies, that can effect such trades can improve on the no-tax equilibrium, as well as on an equilibrium with a lump-sum tax or with a pure consumption tax. However, as long as any government policy that increases a borrower's first-(or a lender's second-) period consumption must pay the financial fee, such a policy cannot improve on the no-tax equilibrium, 22 nor on the equilibrium with a pure consumption tax. Subject to the requirement that all intertemporal transfers pay the fee, both the no tax and the pure consumption tax equilibria are efficient. The difference in MRS between the lender and the borrower reflects the real social cost of transferring resources between the two, and so does not imply any unexploited gains from trade.
The possibility of government economizing on private transactions costs, however, is somewhat tangential to the main argument we address in this paper. Proponents of the full taxation of investment services do not argue that such taxation is justified on the basis of a market failure arising from the existence of intermediation fees. Rather, they argue that full taxation is called for in order to avoid tax distortions in the choice between investment services and other consumption goods. Our point is that such a choice is spurious. In our model, the consumer's choice is between present and future consumption, and leaving that choice unaffected 22 Without the requirement that any policy that effectively transfers resources over time must pay the transactions fee, differential lump-sum taxes could increase social welfare A direct shift of first-period resources from the lender to the borrower, compensated by an opposite shift in second-period resources, could match resources more closely with desired consumption without paying the fee, and so could increase social welfare.
by taxes requires tax exemption of investment related financial services. Moreover, it is not clear how this market failure could be remedied by positive taxation of financial service fees, since presumably the problem is that consumers perceive too high, not too low, a price for intertemporal trades.
Property and Casualty Insurance
Our analysis of property and casualty insurance is similar to our analysis of consumer saving/investing. In the saving analysis, consumers save in order to shift consumption over time. In the insurance analysis, consumers purchase insurance in order to shift consumption over "states of nature," e.g., from good years to bad years when consumption is reduced by some disastrous event such as a flood or a fire. In neither case is the financial service a consumption good. Rather, the service allows the consumer to raise his utility by smoothing his consumption. We show that if consumption in all states is fully taxed, there is no need to tax any fees or charges associated with shifting the consumption across states. Insurance premiums, whether they represent "pure insurance costs" (i.e., the expected loss) or additionally include a "loading fee" (to cover costs associated with intermediation), should be exempt from tax. The rationale is the same as in the investing and consumer loan cases. Insurance is not a consumption good, and so should be left out of the base of a consumption tax.
Suppose that the consumer has an initial endowment of E and faces two possible states of nature, a good state and a bad state. He cares only about his consumption in the good state, C G , and in the bad state, C B . The good state occurs with probability p, while the bad state occurs with probability (1 -p). In the good state, he has available for consumption the full amount of his endowment, E, while in the bad state, he loses an amount L. The consumer can buy insurance against his loss at a per-unit price (i.e., a premium) of π, and so can shift consumption from the good to the bad state. His goal is to maximize his utility by choosing consumption levels in the good and bad states. This amounts to choosing how much insurance to buy, as it is through the purchase of insurance that he can effect a reallocation of resources across states (see, e.g., Varian, (1978, chapter 3) for this approach to insurance).
In the absence of taxes, the consumer's budget constraint is given by
where P B = π/(1 -π) is the relative price of additional consumption in the bad state, 23 and C B -(E -L) is the amount of additional bad state consumption purchased. The consumer's goal is to maximize his utility, which he does by choosing C B and C G 24 so that
To the extent that the premium represents the social cost of insurance, as it would assuming that the insurance industry is competitive, the consumer's consumption choice will be efficient. This is true both when the provision of insurance has no costs and the zero profit premium is actuarially fair (e.g., π = 1 -p), as well as when there are costs (e.g., intermediation 23 The consumer must buy $1/(1 -π) dollars of insurance to increase bad state consumption by $1, since the premium is paid in the bad state This amount of insurance costs $π/(1 -π) of good state consumption; hence, P B = π/(1 -π). 24 He will purchase enough insurance to raise C B sufficiently above E -L so that condition 6 holds. fees) that raise the zero profit premium to (1 -p) * (1 + P i ). 25, 26 Suppose now that the government taxes consumption in both the good and bad states at rate τ, but exempts insurance premiums from the tax. The tax on consumption includes purchases made from the payoff of the insurance policy in the bad state. With this pure consumption tax, the consumer's budget line is
which implies that the tax is efficient as the consumer would set MRS BG equal to the undistorted relative price of consumption in the bad state. The tax is equivalent to a lump-sum tax on his endowment.
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The efficiency of a pure consumption tax is unaffected by the presence of intermediation fees, P i , which would raise the zero profit insurance premium, π, above 1 -p.
Consider next a tax at rate τ on consumption in either state of nature, as well as on the insurance premium. This tax raises the price of bad state consumption to P B ' = π(1 + τ)/(1 -π(1 + τ)). In maximizing his utility, the consumer sets MRS BG = P B ' > P B . This implies that it is possible to raise his utility by making technically feasible trades of bad for good state consumption-by purchasing more insurance. Consequently, this tax is inefficient, a conclusion that is unaffected by the presence of intermediation fees in the premium.
Some of the discussion of VATs (e.g., Barham, Poddar, and Whalley (BPW), 1987) argues that premiums associated with "pure insurance" need not be taxed. That discussion emphasizes, instead, taxing the value added of the insurance industry, what we have been calling the financial service fee. A tax on insurance value added, however, still would distort the consumer's choice of how much insurance to buy. In the presence of a tax on insurance value added (i.e., the loading fee), the consumer's utility maximizing marginal condition would be given by
where the zero profit assumption has been used to set the premium at (1 -p)(1 +(1 + τ)P i ). Since without taxes the consumer would set his marginal rate of substitution equal to (1 -p)(1 + P i )/{1 -(1 -p)(1 + P i )}, the tax on the financial fee leads the consumer to buy too little insurance, and so to underconsume in the bad state.
One politically attractive solution to the tax problem posed by insurance would tax insurance premiums, but exempt from tax 25 In the special case of expected utility maximization, the consumer 's consumption allocation is given by
where MRS BG = φ'(C B )/φ'(C G ) and φ is the utility of wealth function. Assuming nonsatiation, φ' > 0, and if the consumer is risk averse, φ'' < 0.
If there are no costs associated with providing the insurance, then zero profit in the insurance industry implies that π = 1 -p, so that insurance is actuarially fair. If π = 1 -p, then the risk averse expected utility maximizing consumer will fully insure against loss by buying an amount of insurance equal to L; if π = 1 -p, then MRS BG = 1, which is true only if C B = C G , which implies that the consumer fully insures by purchasing an amount of insurance equal to his loss, L.
With financial costs, the zero profit condition implies that π = (1 -p) * (1 + P i ). In this case, although the consumer will not fully insure, his choice will still be efficient since he continues to match his own rate of substitution across states with the rate allowed by technology. 26 The same result would obtain if the intermediation fee were per unit of insurance, ie., if the premium were instead 1 -p + P i . The proportionality assumption is not crucial to our result. 27 The tax base would be E in the good state and E -L in the bad state. consumption out of the proceeds from an insurance claim. This approach, which might be called the prepayment approach to insurance taxation, has been proposed by BPW and Bradford et al. (1984, chapter 4) as a way to tax insurance value added. Evaluated at probability p, the expected value of the flow of taxes under the prepayment approach is τ[π -(1 -p) ]q, where q is the amount of insurance purchased and π -(1 -p) is per-unit insurance value added.
Our analysis also offers support for the prepayment approach, as we find that it is consistent with an efficient allocation of consumption across states. A tax exempt payout raises the benefit of insurance by allowing a unit insurance payoff to buy (1 + τ) worth of consumption. This undoes the effect of taxing the insurance premium, leaving undistorted the relative price of consumption in the bad state.
28
From the consumer's perspective, taxing the premiums and exempting the payoff is equivalent in terms of consumption and utility to simply ignoring insurance and taxing all consumption. Evaluated at the consumer's prices, the higher tax that is paid in the good state, τπq, has exactly the same value as the lower tax that is paid in the bad state τ(1 -π)q, so that net tax paid sums to zero. 29 (If the government faces (or should face) private market prices, then from its perspective revenue from a prepayment approach also would have a zero value.) Thus, while we join BPW and Bradford et al. (1984) in supporting a prepayment approach for insurance, we differ from them in our underlying rationale. In our model, the prepayment approach works because it imposes no tax on the cost of insurance, 30 not because it effectively taxes the loading fee.
Our result differs from BPW and Bradford et al. (1984) because we use a different relative price to evaluate the flow of tax revenue. To compare revenue or consumption in the good state with that in the bad state, one must determine the relative price of bad state revenue/consumption in terms of good state revenue/ consumption forgone. BPW, and implicitly Bradford et al. (1984) , use only the loss probability to determine the relative price of bad state consumption. But, when insurance is costly to provide, the relative price of bad state consumption should reflect this cost, in addition to the loss probability, as it does in our analysis.
In contrast to our approach, it is common in analyzing consumption taxes to adopt a single-state or single-period approach to consumption. The single-state approach treats insurance as a final consumption good on par with, say, food, and concludes that neutrality calls for a full tax on the premium, or at least on the portion of the premium that represents value added. Without such a tax, consumers will substitute too much tax-free insurance for too little other, fully taxed, goods and services. (Merrill and Adrion (1995) cite this as a policy concern, and Barham, Poddar, and Whalley (1987) implicitly adopt this perspective. See also Hoffman, Poddar, and Whalley (1987) and Ballard et al. (1985, especially chapters 3, 5, and 9) .).
Our analysis offers a strikingly different conclusion-insurance value added need not be taxed-because we adopt a different modeling approach. In our model, there is no substitution between 28 This can be seen by noting that with a consumption tax plus a tax on the premium combined with a rebate on the payoff, in the good state, tax-exclusive consumption would be E/(1 + τ) -πq, while in the bad state, tax-exclusive consumption would be (E -L)/(1 + τ) + (1 -π)q, implying that the relative price of a unit of bad state consumption, (-dC G /dq)/(dC B /dq), is π/(1 -π) units of good state consumption. 29 This follows immediately from noting that the relative price of a dollar of bad state consumption is π/(1 -π). 30 This result is comparable to the equivalence between expensing and a zero tax on capital income. insurance and other consumption goods, as insurance is not a consumption good. We model insurance as a nonconsumption good that allows the consumer to raise his utility by smoothing consumption over good and bad states of nature. Insurance offers no "peace of mind" benefit, independent of the higher consumption it allows in the event of a disaster. We find that, as long as consumption (exclusive of insurance premiums) is fully taxed in all states, there is no need to tax the insurance premium as well. Taxing the premium (or the value-added part of the premium) raises the relative price of consumption in the bad state, and so distorts the choice of how to allocate consumption across states of nature.
A related issue is the choice between risky goods and riskless goods. An extension of our modeling approach to allow for a risky and a riskless good shows that our conclusion is unchanged. Consumption efficiency calls for full taxation of all consumption goods, but no tax on insurance premiums, or for the equivalent treatment offered by the combination of a premium tax plus a payoff rebate. 31 A tax on all consumer goods plus a tax on insurance premiums (or on that portion of the premiums attributable to value added) will distort the consumer's choice away from the risky good.
Substitution between insurance and loss prevention also is possible. Both offer protection against loss. For example, one can protect against fire either by purchasing fire insurance or by building a fireproof house. Would exempting from tax the insurance premium, while taxing the cost of fireproofing, lead to too much insurance and too little fireproofing?
No. The seeming inconsistency arises if owner-occupied housing is taxed using the tax prepayment approach, which taxes the purchase of a capital asset while exempting from tax the consumption flow given off by the asset. Because of the difficulty of imputing an annual consumption flow to housing (and other consumer durables, such as automobiles), it is common to consider a tax prepayment approach for such assets. Under a tax prepayment approach, fireproofing expenditures, as well as all other construction costs, would be in the tax base. Yet, there is no inconsistency in combining tax prepayment for housing expenditures (including fireproofing) with tax exemption for insurance premiums. Since the proceeds from an insurance payoff will be fully taxed when used to repair fire damage, the consumption benefit of insurance is fully taxed. Consequently, insurance and direct fireproofing receive consistent tax treatment. 31 The consumer 's budget constraint is Y = P R R + P N N, where Y is (exogenous) income, P R is the price of the risky good, R is units of the risky good, P N is the price of the riskless good, and N is units of the riskless good. The term R is a composite good determined by consumption levels in the good and bad states; R = U(C G ,C B ), where U() is a utility subfunction, C G is consumption of the risky good in the good state, and C B is consumption in the bad state. The term P R is the price of a unit of the composite risky good. An efficient tax would raise the consumer 's prices to (1 + τ)P R and (1 + τ)P N . Let E be resources available for spending on the risky good, E = P R R = Y -P N N. A tax at rate τ on P R R is equivalent, therefore, to a tax at rate τ/(1 + τ) on E. The budget identities E = C G + πq and E = C B + L + πq -q show that a tax at rate τ/(1 + τ) on resources available for spending on the risky good (a tax on base of E) is equivalent to a tax at the rate τ on purchases of the risky good in the good and bad states (C G in the good state; C B + L in the bad state) and on the insurance premium, combined with a payoff rebate. But, these budget constraints plus utility maximization also imply that such a tax is equivalent to a tax at rate τ on purchases of the risky good, with insurance ignored. Hence, a tax on purchases of direct consumption goods (excluding insurance premiums) would not distort the consumer's choice about how to allocate resources between the risky good and the riskless good, nor would it distort his choice about how to allocate consumption of the risky good between the good and bad states.
A final type of substitution is between self-provision of insurance and implicit provision of insurance in the purchase price of a risky asset. For example, one might insure against costly automobile repairs either (a) by purchasing an after-market insurance policy or warranty or (b) by purchasing an automobile with an extensive warranty already included in its price. Our argument is that the purchase of the after-market warranty should not be taxed, as long as the repairs made under the policy are fully taxable. Alternatively, a prepayment approach could be adopted in which the purchase of the after-market policy is taxable, but the repairs funded by the policy are tax free. This latter approach is identical to that which would occur when the cost of a warranty is included in the fully taxable purchase of a car. Hence, there is no inconsistency between not taxing the after-market policy (an immediate deduction approach), but taxing the warranty included in the purchase price of a car (a tax prepayment approach).
Life Insurance
In thinking about life insurance, we consider a model like that used to analyze property insurance. We now interpret the consumer as a household and the loss event as the death of the principal earner, which, if uninsured, would substantially reduce household consumption. In this model, as long as household consumption is fully taxed in both the good and bad states, there is no need for any additional taxes on life insurance premiums.
Consumer Leasing
Rather than purchase a car or other consumer durable, one might instead lease it.
It would seem that the full lease payment should be taxed, since it represents a payment for a flow of consumption services. But, would taxing the full lease payment, including any associated financial service fees, give a tax advantage to purchasing the car directly, rather than leasing? We find that it would not. Taxing financial service fees associated with leasing consumer durables, while ignoring such fees when associated with borrowing to finance a direct purchase, 32 ensures tax neutrality, rather than gives a tax advantage to a direct purchase.
If he borrows to finance the automobile, the consumer pays a borrowing fee directly to the bank. Under a tax prepayment approach to taxing the car, the consumer must borrow enough to pay the tax-inclusive price (1 + τ)P, where P is the nontax cost (the resource cost) of the car. On the assumption that the consumer enters into a series of one-year loans with the bank, the annual net payment from him to the bank is (1 + τ)P(1 + P i )(1 + r) -(1 + τ)P = (1 + τ) P(r(1 + P i ) + P i ). In equilibrium, this net payment equals the value of the annual consumption flow given off by the car. It is apparent that the consumption flow from the automobile is fully taxed, so the prepayment approach is efficient. The price of automobile services obtained by borrowing is unchanged relative to the price of other consumption goods. 33 We turn now to the lease. To keep things comparable, we assume that the leasing company also must borrow to purchase the car. If it faces the same borrowing fee as the consumer, 34 then the leasing company requires an annual payment of P(r(1 + P i ) + P i ) in order to cover its borrowing 32 Our result is unchanged if the consumer instead saves to buy the car or simply buys the car out of current labor earnings. 33 Note, however, that taxation of the purchase price of the car, plus a separate tax on the borrowing fee, would overtax automobile services. 34 If the financial fee rises with the amount borrowed, then the leasing company may have a price advantage, as it does not have to borrow enough to pay the tax on the purchase of the automobile, whereas the consumer has to borrow the tax. But this is a second-order effect that is not directly relevant to our main argument.
costs. 35 If the entire lease payment is taxed, then the consumer's annual lease payment rises in proportion to the tax rate on consumption. Thus, the relative price of leasing is unchanged. In particular, the consumption tax does not change the price of obtaining automobile services by leasing relative to the price of obtaining them by borrowing.
Checking Accounts: Promotional Gifts and Financial Services
Promotional gifts generally should be included in the base of a consumption tax, since they appear generally to be consumption. Thus, the proverbial toaster received when opening a checking account should be taxed. 36, 37 Checking account services (e.g., the bookkeeping service provided by monthly statements, the safe-keeping service associated with holding your money in a secure bank vault, and the convenience of not having to carry cash) are more problematic. 38 A good deal of judgment is required in determining whether some of these services are or are not consumption goods. Our view is that the safekeeping value of a checking account probably should not be taxed, to the extent that all consumption goods are taxed. 39 The bookkeeping value of a checking account is harder to catagorize. To the extent that it is viewed as a consumption item, it should be taxed. We have no strong opinion on this, but do note that the issue is fairly large in scope, as it relates to any bookkeeping or recordkeeping services purchased by a household, not just those offered by banks. If forced to make a judgment, we would come down in favor of no tax on bookkeeping services, as they seem to us fairly far removed from consumption. The convenience value of checks may be a consumption item, but the argument probably is not airtight.
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Our no-tax argument clearly puts pressure on the distinction between consumption goods and services and other goods and services. In general, to the extent that financial services directly yield utility, they are consumption goods and so should be taxed. Otherwise, we argue that they should not be taxed. As an example of the difficulty this poses, consider an investor 's payment to his stockbroker. Some part of this payment is for hardnosed investment advice, and so by our argument should not be taxed. But, if an investor simply enjoys talking to his stockbroker, then part of the fee he pays his broker should be included in the base of a consumption tax.
Such problems plague consumption taxes generally, however. Nothing is special about the case of financial services.
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35 Any other fees imposed by the leasing company also should be taxed, as they represent payment for a consumption service. With such fees, the lease would be more expensive than direct borrowing, but full taxation would preserve the relative price differential and so would be efficient. A similar comment applies if the bank charges the leasing company and the consumer different service fees; in the no-tax world, the lease payment will not exactly equal the annual loan payment, but full taxation of the lease will preserve the relative price difference. 36 A cash gift might not be taxed when received, if it would be taxed when spent on consumption goods (e.g., as under a national sales tax). 37 The mechanics of how the toaster would be taxed may differ depending on the type of consumption tax chosen. Under a national sales tax, for example, the gift of a toaster would be viewed as a taxable sale to the consumer. Under a consumed income tax, the value of the toaster would be included in the recipient's taxable income. The details of such implementation issues, however, are not the focus of our paper. 38 Bradford (1996) discusses the possibility that checking account services might not be a consumption item. 39 Similarly, a home safe used to hold cash and valuables should not be taxed, as the safe itself is not a consumption good. 40 Personal use of "business" assets, such as automobiles, is just one example of the more general problem.
Consumption taxes must rely on practical definitions of consumption that may in some cases be imperfect, and so allow possibilities for tax abuse and fraud. In designing a consumption tax, tax officials must weigh the efficiency benefit of not taxing nonconsumption use of financial services, against the cost of tax fraud and abuse associated with attempts to classify consumption goods as nonconsumption goods. This calculus may imply a tax on financial services in order to effectively balance these two sets of concerns.
As emphasized by Merrill (1997) , there also may be some practical difficulty persuading voters and politicians that financial services should not be taxed. Merrill (1997) also argues that it may be difficult to exclude many financial products from tax, even if exclusion is justified on efficiency grounds. His concern centers around the difficulty of unbundling financial services, which are typically supplied jointly with other products such as repair insurance sold jointly with an automobile (as a warranty) or the financial service component of lease payments.
Our analysis, however, suggests that unbundling may not be as large a problem as Merrill fears. A prepayment approach can be used to tax many financial services supplied jointly with other products, as in the case of an automobile warranty. Efficiency calls for taxing financial fees associated with leasing consumer durables. In such cases, unbundling is not necessary.
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COMPARISON WITH WHALLEY
Whalley (1991) has analyzed a problem very similar to ours, using a model very similar to ours. 42 But, while his conclusions are similar in broad terms to our own, we differ in three important details.
First, he argues that his analysis applies to many nonfinancial services. As discussed above, using transportation services as an example, we disagree. Most nonfinancial services seem to us to be consumables, and so properly are handled by inclusion in the base of a consumption tax.
Second, Whalley does not see his model applying to insurance (other than saving through life insurance policies). As explained above, we think our model does apply to insurance.
Third, Whalley argues for a low tax, not no tax, on financial services. In his view, reducing the use of financial intermediation services, by taxing them, offers a benefit that potentially offsets the price distortions we have emphasized above. This benefit arises because financial services have a real cost, but do not yield direct utility. Consequently, they represent a drain of resources from the economy, so that a reduction in their use implies that fewer resources are drained from the system, leaving more available to fund utility increasing consumption. In essence, Whalley argues that financial services are inefficiently oversupplied in a no-tax equilibrium and that their taxation tax can help rectify this market failure.
We do not follow Whalley's argument for a positive tax rate on financial services. We do not see how consumers are better off with less borrowing and lending. As the fee represents a real resource cost, we see no externality associated with borrowing and lending. Nor can we obtain his result in a two-consumer, two-period model similar to the one he discusses. Nonetheless, we agree that if financial services were oversupplied, then taxing them would offer a benefit. We note, however, that market failure issues are not at the heart of the usual argument in support of 41 Other types of bundling may continue to be a problem For a discussion of problems caused by bundling of real costs and interest costs, see Bradford (1996) . 42 See also Chia and Whalley (1998) They also use a similar analysis to argue that free trade in banking services may not improve welfare in Chia and Whalley (1997) .
full taxation of financial services under a consumption tax. The full tax argument is based on a desire to eliminate tax distortions in relative consumption prices, not on a desire to correct a market failure. Our analysis, and Whalley's, shows that avoiding tax distortions is achieved without a tax on many financial services.
CONCLUSIONS
We have considered the taxation of a variety of financial services used by households under a consumption tax. In the important cases of investment services, insurance services, and services associated with consumer loans, we question whether an explicit tax on the service is necessary to achieve a neutral consumption tax. We find that if the government fully taxes all direct consumption of goods and services, then also taxing these financial intermediation services will distort the consumer's decisions. The rationale for our result is that a consumption tax should only tax consumption. Investment services, insurance services, and loan services seem to us properly modeled as nonconsumption goods, and so should be tax exempt.
Our conclusions are in marked contrast to much of the consumption tax literature. Nonetheless, our conclusions can be interpreted as consistent with cashflow accounting principles applied to the household (see, e.g., Bradford et al., 1984, chapter 4) . 43 For example, under a cash-flow tax, it is fairly easy to accept the deduction of a household's investment advisory fees. Deduction of the fees associated with consumer loans also typically would be allowed by cash-flow principles applied to a household, as cash received from a lender typically is taxed, while any cash paid back to the lender (including payments to cover the cost of issuing the loan) is deducted. Cash-flow accounting applied to a household's purchase of insurance would seem to exempt the premium and tax the payoff, as we suggest, but the equivalent treatment of a premium tax combined with a payment rebate also would work, and is suggested in a model cash-flow tax put forth by the U.S. Treasury (Bradford et al., 1984, chapter 4) . Thus, while our analysis offers a perspective and a set of results that differ from much of the consumption tax literature, our policy prescriptions are not entirely unheard of and are supported by cashflow principles.
